|
|
In re Investigation of Accident on the Oregon
Short Line Railroad near Banks, Idaho, on August 31, 1913.
On August 31, 1913, there was a derailment of a light engine
on the Oregon Short Line Railroad near Banks, Idaho, resulting
in the death of 2 employee and the injury of 3 employees,
one of whom subsequently died.
After investigation of this accident the Chief Inspector
of Safety Appliances reports as follows:
On the morning of August 31, 1913, locomotive No. 724, in
charge of Engineman Eggers and Conductor Moffatt, left Nampa,
Idaho, with a special westbound passenger train bound for
Belvidere, Idaho. On their arrival at Montour, a station
41 miles west of Nampa, a pilot was furnished on account
of the engineman being unfamiliar with the road beyond that
point. On arrival at Belvidere, Locomotive No. 724 was cut
off from the train and the crew was directed to return east
to Banks, a station 23.1 miles west of Montour, to help
an extra westbound freight train to Smith’s Ferry,
18.9 miles west of Banks. On account of an in-sufficient
supply of coal on locomotive No. 724 the crew in charge
were directed to proceed to Smith’s Ferry, secure
a car of coal there and take it to Big Eddy, a station 7.7
miles east of Smith’s Ferry and 11.2 miles west of
Banks, and at that point have men shovel the coal into the
tender of the locomotive. After this was done the crew in
charge left Big Eddy with only the locomotive, with the
intention of running light to Banks to help the freight
train as directed. Shortly after leaving Big Eddy the engineman
lost control of the locomotive, and while running at a speed
of about 60 miles per hour it was derailed at a point about
6.3 miles east of that station.
This accident occurred on a ten-degree curve loading toward
the right. After leaving the rails the locomotive traveled
about 200 feet before coming to a stop against the mountain,
resting on its left side about 12 feet from the north side
of the track. The tender was torn loose from the locomotive,
the frame being about 15 feet from the track on the north
side of the same, with the cistern about 6 feet away from
it. The damage to the track was slight; in fact none of
the ties had to be removed. The weather was clear.
That part of the Idaho Northern Branch of the Oregon Short
Line Railroad on which this accident occurred, extending
from Montour to Smith’s Ferry, was under construction,
but was to be turned over officially to the transportation
department at 12:01 a.m., September 1, 1913. Between Big
Eddy and Banks the track is on a 2.5% grade, descending
for southbound trains, with many curves varying from 6 ***
to 12 ***.
Locomotive No. 724 was equipped with a No. 2 New York air
pump, Von McKee old style New York brake valve, and plain
New York driving and tender brake triples, all in good condition.
There is a two-way valve in the cab which, when placed in
the cut-out position, applies the driving wheel brakes independently,
and cuts them out of the train brake system, so that they
cannot be applied automatically. Engineman Eggers had this
valve in the cut-out position while coaling at Big Eddy,
and it was found to be in the same position after the accident.
It is evident, therefore, that during the time the engine
was being coaled the driving wheel brakes leaked off, and
when Engineman Eggers started away from there he forgot
to place the valve in the cut-in position, leaving him with
only the tender brakes to depend on, and they were not sufficient
to hold the engine, especially as they were improperly manipulated,
according to the statement of Engineman Eggers himself.
Engineman Eggers stated that the brakes worked properly
when hauling the car of coal from Smith’s Ferry to
Big Eddy. At Big Eddy a stop of 25 or 30 minutes was made
while the locomotive was being coaled. During this period
the valve was in the cut-out position. Before leaving Big
Eddy he applied and released the brakes, but did not observe
the piston travel on the tender or driving wheel brakes,
neither did he do so when leaving Smith’s Ferry for
Big Eddy. The brakes worked properly after leaving both
places, and the gauge indicated a train line air pressure
of 90 pounds. He stated positively, however, that when he
left Big Eddy all the brakes were cut in. The reverse lever
was two notches from the full forward position, which he
considered to be the proper position while descending this
grade. After leaving Big Eddy he made the first application
of the air brakes within a distance of about 200 yards;
this reduced the speed of the locomotive. After proceeding
about 200 yards further he made a second application of
the brakes, which again checked the speed of the locomotive,
which at that time was about 10 miles an hour. When about
a mile from Big Eddy he made a third application of the
brakes and then discovered that the locomotive was beyond
his control and running away. He tried to reverse the locomotive
but was unable to do so and called the fireman to assist
him. With their combined efforts, however, they were unable
to reverse the locomotive. Just as the derailment occurred
he told the fireman to jump; he did so and was killed, while
Engineman Eggers remained in the cab. He stated that at
several other times on this trip it had been necessary for
the fireman to assist him in reversing the engine. He thought
the accident was due to the brakes not being sufficient
to hold the engine on such a heavy grade.
Brakeman Coons stated he noted as pilot on locomotive No.
724 when it was hauling the special train from Montour to
Belvidere, and had cautioned Engineman Eggers about the
steep grades, advising him to be careful and not let his
train get the best of him. On previous occasions he had
advised other engineman to reverse their engines when going
down this grade in order to control the speed.
Assistant Engineer Elliott, who had supervision of the engines
in work train service on this division, stated that he did
not consider it necessary to furnish a pilot on locomotive
No. 724 on its return trip from Belvidere to Smith’s
Ferry. However, in case a pilot was needed Brakeman Scott,
who went back with locomotive No. 724, was familiar with
the road and could have acted in that capacity.
Several employees who had operated this locomotive on this
division during the month preceding the date of the accident
stated that the brakes were in good condition and that no
trouble had been experienced in properly controlling the
speed.
Conductor Moffatt, who was on locomotive No. 724 at the
time it was derailed, stated that the engineman seemed to
make all the stops previous to reaching Big Eddy without
any difficulty, and be thought the brakes were sufficient
to hold the locomotive on the grade on which the accident
occurred.
This accident was caused by the failure of Engineman Eggers
to place the two-way valve on locomotive No. 724 in the
cut-in position before leaving Big Eddy. His failure to
do so left him with an inadequate air pressure to work the
air brakes, resulting in losing control of his locomotive.
Engineman Eggers was negligent in not assuring himself that
this two-way valve was in the cut-in position and that the
brakes worked properly before starting down the 2.5% grade
from Big Eddy.
Engineman Eggers entered the service of the Oregon Short
Line Railroad as a fireman on March 7, 1907, and on July
26, 1912, was promoted to engineman. During his service
as a fireman he was discharged on one occasion for refusing
to go on duty, while on January 20, 1913, he was derated
for failure carefully to inspect his engine. At the time
of the accident Engineman Eggers had been on duty 13 hours
and 10 minutes, after a period off duty of about 36 hours.
|
|