ACCIDENT ON THE UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD MINIDOKA, IDAHO
MARCH 19, 1937
INVESTIGATION NO. 2162
SUMMARY
Railroad: Union Pacific
Date: March 19, 1937
Location: Minidoka, Idaho
Kind of accident: Rear-end collision
Train involved: Freight : Freight
Train numbers: Extra 2555 : Extra 2002
Engine numbers: 2555 : 2002
Engine numbers: 27 cars and caboose : 16 cars and caboose
Speed: Standing : 12-15 m.p.h.
Track: 3 degree 30'curve; slight ascending grade for east-bound
trains.
Weather: Clear
Time: 2 a.m.
Casualties: 2 killed and 3 injured
Cause: Failure of Extra 2002 to be operated under proper control
within yard limits.
May 11, 1937
To the Commission:
On March 19, 1937, there was a rear-end collision between
two freight trains on the Union Pacific Railroad at Minidoka,
Ida., which resulted in the death of one employee and one
stock caretaker, and the injury of three stock caretakers.
Location and method of operation
This accident occurred on the Twin Falls Branch of the Idaho
Division, Central District, which extends between Buhl and
Minidoka, Ida., a distance of 73.8 miles. In the vicinity
of the point of accident this is a single-track line over
which trains are operated by timetable and train orders, no
form of block system being in use. Trains in the same direction
must keep at least 10 minutes apart, except in closing up
at stations. The accident occurred within yard limits at a
point 6,480 feet east of the yard-limit board. Approaching
this point from the west on the Twin Falls Branch, the track
is tangent for several miles, followed by a 3 degree 30'curve
to the right 1,768 feet in length, the accident occurring
on this curve at a point 707 feet from its western end. The
grade for east-bound trains is 0.219 percent ascending at
the point of accident.
The Twin Falls Branch connects with the main line of the Idaho
Division at Minidoka and a Y is located at the junction; the
main line of the Twin Falls Branch forms the south leg of
the Y, upon which the accident occurred. An auxiliary track,
known as track 2, parallels this leg of the Y on the north
and joins it near the junction switch. Yard tracks parallel
both sides of the main track on the Twin Falls Branch west
of the Y, and at the time of the accident several cars were
standing at the east end of track 7, which lies immediately
south of the main track, and the range of vision of the engineman
of an eastbound train across the curve to the point of accident
was restricted to about 617 feet.
The maximum speed limit for freight trains within yard limits
at stations located on branch lines is 15 miles per hour,
and speed must be as much lower as conditions require.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 2 a.m.
Description
Extra 2555, an east-bound freight train, consisted of 27 cars
and a caboose, hauled by engine 2555, and was in charge of
Conductor Johnson and Engineman Miller. This train departed
from Burley, 21.7 miles from Minidoka, at 11:50 p.m., March
18, according to the train sheet, having passed Extra 2002
at that point, arrived at Minidoka at 1:25 a.m., March 19,
and pulled out on the Idaho Division main track and stopped
with the caboose near the station where 3 stock caretakers
and a brakeman, off duty, boarded the caboose. The train was
then backed down the Twin Falls Branch main track to clear
No. 2. track; the engine and four cars were cut off in order
to do station work, and while this was being done the rear
portion of the train was struck by Extra 2002.
Extra 2002, an east-bound freight train, consisted of 16 cars
and a caboose, hauled by engine 2002, and was in charge of
Conductor Wittman and Engineman Merritt. This train departed
from Burley at 12:45 a.m., March 19, according to the train
sheet, passed Rupert at 1:15 a.m. and collided with the rear
end of Extra 2555 while traveling at a speed variously estimated
to have been between 12 and 15 miles per hour.
Engine 2002 telescoped the caboose of Extra 2555 its entire
length and partly telescoped the car ahead of the caboose,
the caboose and rear car were demolished and the debris was
destroyed by fire. The second car from the caboose was demolished,
and the rear truck of the next car was derailed, this car
being slightly damaged. Engine 2002 sustained only slight
damage. The employee killed was a brakeman who was deadheading
in the caboose of Extra 2555.
Summary of evidence
Conductor Johnson, of Extra 2555, stated that on arriving
at Minidoka at 1:25 a.m. his train stopped with the caboose
in front of the station. He went to the office and received
instructions to pick up 10 cars of stock, together with three
stockmen. He notified the stockmen to board the caboose at
that time to avoid stopping the train later, and a brakeman,
who was off duty, also boarded the caboose. About 1:35 a.m.
the train was backed down the Twin Falls Branch main line
for a distance of about 24 car lengths; the air brakes were
applied and a cut was made between the fourth and fifth cars.
The head portion, accompanied by the entire crew, then departed
to perform necessary station work and they were so engaged
when the rear portion of the train was struck by Extra 2002.
The caboose marker and cupola lights were in good condition
and were burning brightly. Conductor Johnson stated that he
had been on this run for the past 3 years and he had frequently
left his caboose on the main line. The statements of the other
members of the crew of Extra 2555 added nothing of importance.
Engineman Merritt, of Extra 2002, stated that he entered the
yard-limits at a speed of approximately 15 miles per hour,
and found it necessary to use steam in order to maintain that
speed. Approaching the highway grade crossing, located about
490 feet west of the point of accident, he was operating with
a drifting throttle, and as he sounded the crossing whistle
signal a man stepped out from behind some cars that were standing
on track 7, and from his actions appeared to have been struck
by the engine. Engineman Merritt then looked back to see what
had happened to the man and did not look ahead again until
after the engine had passed over the crossing; he then saw
red marker lights ahead, one bright and the other dim. He
was unable to tell whether the lights were on the main track
or track 2, which was to the left of the main track, and he
hesitated a moment before applying the brakes. In an instant,
however, he was able to locate the marker lights definitely
and he closed the throttle and applied the air brakes in emergency;
at that time he thought he was about 6 car lengths from the
caboose. He was of the opinion that if his attention had not
been distracted by the man near the crossing he would. have
seen the train ahead in time to stop, and would have realized
the fact that the marker lights that he saw were red and indicated
that the rear end was on the main track. Engineman Merritt
stated that he had found trains standing on the main track
at various points within the yard, but on the night of the
accident he figured that Extra 2555 had plenty of time to
have left Minidoka before the arrival of his train.
Fireman Hatch, of Extra 2002, stated that his train moved
through yard limits at approximately 15 miles per hour. Due
to the curve to the right approaching the junction at Minidoka
his view ahead was very much restricted. Immediately after
passing the road crossing he heard the air brakes applied
in emergency, looked out and saw the caboose marker lights
about 5 or 6 car lengths ahead. He further stated that the
air brakes functioned properly en route, but did not seem
to take hold as rapidly as they should when the emergency
application was made, and that Engineman Merritt had sounded
the whistle signal for the highway crossing.
Conductor Wittman, of Extra 2002, stated that the air brakes
had been tested at Twin Falls, their initial terminal, and
he estimated the speed to have been 15 miles per hour or less
when he felt the air brakes being applied in emergency, followed
in a second or two by the collision. Swing Brakeman Allen
thought the train traveled a distance of about 3 or 4 car
lengths after the brakes had been applied, while Flagman Hahne
stated that it seemed quite a while to him from the time the
air brakes were applied in emergency to the time of the accident.
Discussion
Rule 93 provides that within yard limits the main track may
be used, protecting against first-class trains. All trains
and engines must move within yard limits prepared to stop
unless the main track is seen or known to be clear. Special
instructions in the timetable limit the speed of freight trains
within yard limits on branch lines to 15 miles per hour, and
require a lower speed when conditions require it.
Engineman Merritt, of Extra 2002, was operating his train
at the allowable speed of 15 miles per hour within the yard
limits, but on approaching a highway grade crossing, located
490 feet west of the point of accident, his attention was
attracted by a man who stepped out from behind some cars standing
on the yard track south of the main track, and he did not
look ahead until after passing the crossing, at which time
he saw the caboose marker lights. Even then he hesitated before
taking any action toward stopping his train as he was not
sure whether the train ahead was on the main track or on track
2 which paralleled the main track on the left. An instant
later, however, he saw that the train was on the main track
and applied the air brakes in emergency, at which time he
thought his engine was about 5 or 6 car lengths from it. Statements
of the entire crew indicated that the speed of Extra 2002
was not in excess of 15 miles per hour when the emergency
application was made, but the damage sustained indicates that
either the speed was higher, or the distance was less than
estimated.
Conclusion
This accident was caused by the failure of Extra 2002 to be
operated under proper control within yard limits.
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